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NOTES
many claims with extremely large damages, in which the plaintiff's
losses might greatly exceed the defendant's illegal gains."" Thus, the
suggested alternative to Birnbaum would not automatically overburden
the defendant with excessive judgments. On the other hand, however,
the protective purposes of the 1934 Act will not be carried out to the
fullest extent possible if nonpurchasers and nonsellers are not pro-
tected to some degree in open market dealings.
ROBERT E. FOX
Antitrust Law—Application of the Data Processing Standing Test
in Treble -Damage Actions—Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp. 1 —In
1968, Malco Petroleum, Inc., three real estate investment companies,
and Jack and Anne Malamud, the officers, directors, and sole
shareholders of the four corporate plaintiffs, instituted an action
against Sinclair Oil Corp. in federal district court alleging violations of
section 1 of the Sherman Act2 and section 3 of the Clayton Act3 aris-
ing out of a series of transactions between the parties. 4 Sinclair and
Malco had entered into a distribution agreement in 1965. 5 Under the
terms of the agreement, Sinclair promised to supply Malco with pe-
troleum products for resale to retail customers. The parties to the
agreement also arrived at an oral understanding whereby Sinclair was
to supply financial assistance to the three investment companies to aid
them in acquiring and developing new service stations. 6 Subsequent to
the agreement, Sinclair refused financial assistance in five possible ac-
quisitions proposed by Jack Malamud acting as an officer of the in-
vestment companies.' After Sinclair had refused to assist in all five of
the proposed ventures, Jack Malamud negotiated a new contract with
Texaco, Inc. and unsuccessfully sought an early termination of the
contract between Malco and Sinclair' Subsequently, the contract ran
its course and, upon termination, Malco executed a new distribution
agreement with Texaco, Inc. covering those service stations which had
previously been supplied by Sinclair."
The gist of plaintiffs' antitrust claim was that the agreement be-
tween Sinclair and Malco required Malco to secure its supply of prod-
2" See Note, 16 B.C. IND. & Cost. L. Ri:v. 503, 512-13 (1975).
1 521 F.2d 1142 (fith Cir. 1975).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
3
 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
Malarnud, 521 F.2d at 1144-45.
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ucts as well as the financing necessary for expansion from Sinclair,
restricting Malco's freedom to secure financial assistance from any of
Sinclair's competitors. Plaintiffs also claimed that Sinclair's enforce-
ment of the distribution contract, in conjunction with its failure to
provide financing, illegally lessened competition and restrained trade
in petroleum products by limiting. the number of new service stations."
The investment companies' theory of causation—advanced to
satisfy the requirement of section 4 of the Clayton Act" that the al-
leged injury has been caused "by reason or something forbidden in
the antitrust laws—was that Sinclair's failure to provide assistance, and
its refusal to free Malco to negotiate with other companies by agree-
ing to an early termination of the contract, prevented the investment
companies from acquiring new service stations and, therefore, pre-
vented them from realizing the profits which would have flowed from
expansion and sales growth." Malco's theory was that it lost profits
from unrealized sales to the prospective service stations." The
Malamuds alleged that their financial interests in all of the corporate
plaintiffs would have been improved by the expansion which would
have taken place but for Sinclair's insistence on adherence to the
contract.' 4
On a motion for reconsideration of a denial of its motion for
summary judgment, Sinclair challenged the standing of all of the
plaintiffs on the ground that they had not been directly injured by
any of the alleged antitrust violations." The district court held that all
of the plaintiffs had standing." However, the district court also held
that in order to sustain a cause of action under section 4, plaintiffs
had to "prove an injury ... which bears a direct and causal relation-
ship to the proven anti-trust violation."" The trial court concluded
that, as a matter of law, neither the Malamuds nor Malco could estab-
'° In order to succeed on the merits of their § 1 and § 3 claims, plaintiffs would
have to adduce facts to show that the contractual agreement between Malco and Sinclair
was a tying arrangement which had the effect of restraining trade in petroleum prod-
ucts. Malco was required under its agreement with Sinclair to buy its needed pe-
troleum products from Sinclair. By virtue of this arrangement, Malco lacked the lever-
age of a potential purchaser of petroeleum products with respect to other oil com-
panies, thus making it impossible to persuade such companies to finance the construc-
tion of new Malco-operated service stations. Therefore, Malco was virtually foreclosed
from seeking alternative sources of financing. The requirements agreement between
Malco and Sinclair limited Malco's ability to secure comparable financing elsewhere,
thus providing Sinclair with "sufficient economic power with respect to the tying prod-
uct [financing] to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied prod-
uct [petroleum products]." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
Similarly, the failure of Sinclair to finance such construction restrained Malco's sale of
petroleum products.
" 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).








fish such a direct injury and Sinclair's motion for summary judgment
was granted as to those plaintiffs." With regard to the investment
companies, however, the district court found that there was a genuine
issue as to a material fact with respect to the directness of their
injuries." Therefore, Sinclair's motion for summary judgment as to
the investment companies was denied. 2 ° Subsequently, the district
court certified for appeal the question of the investment companies'
standing to sue." Thereafter, Sinclair filed an interlocutory appeal
from the district court's order partially denying its motion for sum-
mary judgment, and challenged the investment companies' standing
before the circuit court. 22 The only plaintiffs appearing on appeal
were the three investment companies (hereinafter "plaintiffs" or "in-
vestment companies").
The United States Court of Appeals' for the Sixth Circuit af-
firmed, on the basis of the standing test in Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 23 and HELD: An investment com-
pany alleging an inability to expand its operations due to the
" Id.
" Id. at 1146 n.7. The district court concluded that an unresolved question of
fact remained in the issue of whether the investment companies' injury was caused by
Sinclair's refusal to finance, or whether it resulted solely from the investment com-
panies failure to secure alternative Financing, as was claimed by Sinclair. Id. Also left
unresolved was a mixed question of law and fact in the issue of whether Sinclair's
refusal to provide financial assistance had the effect of making the Sinclair-Malco con-
tract an illegal requirements contract violative of § I of the Sherman Act and § 3 of
the Clayton Act. Id.
" Id. at 1146. The district court reached different results with respect to the mo-
tions for summary judgment directed against the investment companies and the other
two plaintiffs by adding to the standing requirements imposed by the standing test de-
veloped in Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970), the requirement of directness of injury as set forth in Volasco Prods. Co.
v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907
(1963). 521 F.2d at 1145-46. Although ostensibly separating the question of standing
from that of directness of injury, the district court in fact equated the two. By denying
Sinclair's motion with respect to the investment companies and granting the motion
with respect to the other two plaintiffs, the district court demanded not only that
plaintiffs make a showing adequate to satisfy the requirements of Data Processing but
also that they plead facts sufficient to show a directness of injury. id.
While the circuit court agreed with the district court's finding that the Data
Processing test was the proper test for determining treble damage standing, it disagreed
with the manner in which the district court applied the test. The circuit court rejected
the district court's addition of the direct injury requirement by making it clear that
Volasco was not a case setting forth standing requirements but was one to be relied upon
only when determining the merits of a case. Id. at 1150. Under the circuit court's view,
summary judgment might not have been granted against Malco and the Malamuds.
Such a result would flow from the court of appeals' approach since the operative facts
constituting the claims of all three original plaintiffs were the same. If a material ques-
tion of fact remained unresolved as to one plaintiff it would also have remained unre-
solved as to the other plaintiffs, and summary judgment would have been equally inap-
propriate to the claims of all three plaintiffs.
" 52l F.2d at 1146.
"Id. at 1143.
23 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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defendant's failure to provide promised financial assistance has al-
leged an injury in fact, 24 and a "denial of [such) financing arguably
comes within the zone of interests protected by the Sherman and
Clayton Acts." 25 In so holding, the court of appeals adopted the dis-
trict court's conclusion that the two-pronged standing test developed
by the Supreme Court in Data Processing" was the appropriate test for
determining standing in treble damage actions. 27
The Sixth Circuit rejected the approaches used in the other cir-
cuits to determine standing in section 4 actions" on the ground that
they demanded too much of plaintiffs in the pleading stages of a
case." The court reasoned that the Data Processing test was more ap-
propriate than the other antitrust standing tests since it could be
utilized without enabling a court "to make a determination on the
merits of a claim under the guise of assessing the standing of the
claimant."" The issue of the proper standing test in treble damage
cases has yet to receive definitive treatment by the Supreme Court.
This note will examine the appropriateness of the Data Processing
standing test in private antitrust actions. It will first consider the prin-
ciples underlying the development of standing tests in antitrust cases.
Next, the standing tests which have previously been adopted by the
courts to respond to such principles will be examined. Then it will
consider whether the Data Processing test—developed for use in ad-
ministrative actions—ought to be controlling in treble damage cases.
Finally, the problems in the application of the Data Processing test will
be examined to determine whether that test is more likely to success-
fully reflect the principles relevant to the formulation of an antitrust
standing test than the tests presently in use.
I. PRESENT STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING STANDING IN SECTION 4
CASES: THE DIRECT-INJURY TEST AND THE TARGET-AREA TEST
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides: "Any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained . "31 The language of the statute is clear
and the class of persons entitled to sue thereunder almost limitless,
since any antitrust violation may have some injurious effect on many
" 521 F.2d at 1151.
26 Id, at 1152.
26 397 U.S. at 152-53.
" 521 F.2d at 1151.
" See cases cited at notes 48 & 49 infra.
"521 F.2d at 1149.
36 Id. at 1150 (emphasis in original).
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
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areas of the economy." A literal interpretation of section 4 would
secure a right of recovery not only for the investment companies in
Malamud but for any person who could allege an injury and a causal
connection between that injury and the alleged antitrust violation, no
matter how attenuated the causal chain might be.
Judicial awareness of the ramifications—such as spurious
claims," windfall judgments," "over-kill,"" and multiplicity of suits
and duplication of recovery"—of such a broad and literal reading of
section 4 has resulted in repeated attempts by the courts to limit the
scope of the remedy afforded by that section." The federal courts
have often resorted to the law of standing to accomplish this
purpose." In so doing, the courts have developed a standing doc-
trine, "peculiar to antitrust,"" which attempts to draw a line of de-
marcation between those plaintiffs who should be allowed to sue
under section 4 and those who should not on the basis not only of the
as
	 re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No, 31, 481 F.2d 12'2, 125 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973). See Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements
of a Treble-Damage Antitrust Action, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 691, 701 (1963).
33 See Comment, 64 CoLust. L. REV. 570 (1964) where the author described the
courts' imposition of a limitation on the availability of 4 relief as a response to "the
need to eliminate spurious claims brought for the purpose of coercing settlement or
lured by the possibility of a treble damage windfall." Id. at 585.
34 See Conference or Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir.
1951), cert, denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
" See Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454
F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972), where the court justified the
rules of standing which narrowly construe the language of § 4 by stating:
Furthermore if the flood-gates were opened to permit treble damage suits
by every creditor, stockholder, employee, subcontractor, or supplier of
goods and services that might be affected, the lure of a treble recovery,
would result in an over-kill, due to an enlargement of the private
weapon to a caliber far exceeding that contemplated by Congress.
Id. at 1295.
a"See Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 733 (3d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971): Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir.
1910).
37 See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, l25
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prods.
Corp., 224 F.2d 678, 679 (2c1 Cir. 1955). cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956). As one
court has noted the antitrust laws "should not be literally construed if unreasonable re-
sults would be reached by doing so. Obviously, there must be a limit somewhere." Har-
rison v. Paramount Pictures, inc., 115 F. Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1953), affd per
curiam, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
38
 See cases cited at notes 48 & 49 infra. Although the courts have consistently at-
tempted to limit the scope of recovery provided by § 4 by resorting to the law of stand-
ing, see Malamud, 521 F.2d at 1146, it should be noted that another approach to the
problem of limitation in other areas of the law is to address the issue by narrowing the
scope of the cause of action and not tampering with the requirements of standing. See,
e.g., glue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores; 421 U.S. 723, 738-48 (1975). However,
the Malamud court viewed the Data Processing test itself as involving a "policy of judi-
cial self-restraint" to be pursued by resort to the law of standing rather than by limiting
the scope of the cause of action. 521 F.2d at 1149.
88
 Malamud, 521 F.2d at 1148.
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jurisdictional concept grounded in Article III but also on the basis of
judicial self-restraint conservatively applied in section 4 cases. 4° The
reasons commonly given by the courts to justify such a line are the
severity of the treble damage remedy provided by the section,' the
prevention of multiple suits,'" and the discernment of a congressional
intent not to provide a remedy for every injury that might possibly be
attributed to an antitrust violation.43
These interests however, are not the only factors which must be
considered when devising a standing doctrine; the courts must also be
responsive to the entire legislative plan for the enforcement of the an-
titrust laws. By creating the section 4 private action, Congress sought
not only to redress an injury to the individual but also to deter parties
from engaging in activities prohibited by the antitrust laws through
the threat of private treble damages liability." The private litigant was
" See id. In general, any standing doctrine has at its base the limitations imposed
by the Constitution on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Article III, § 2 requires a
"case" or "controversy" to invoke the power of the federal judiciary. For a claim to he
imbued with the features of a "case" or "controversy" it must be capable of being "pre-
sented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial
resolution." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968). In order to assure the necessary
adverseness. the Supreme Court has stated that a party seeking to invoke a court's
jurisdiction must have a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy." Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). If a personal stake were the only requirement imposed
on a litigant, any injury would suffice. But in all areas of law, and certainly in antitrust,
not every injury is afforded protection. Many courts in antitrust have looked not only at
the "case" . or "controversy" language of § 4—"any person who is injured" (emphasis
added)—but have also required a plaintiff to satisfy the "causation" language of that
section as well. See, e.g., In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481
F.2d 122, 126, 129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Billy Baxter, Inc. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971);
South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 418 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358,
363 (9th Cir. 1955); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910). Thus,
the "by reason of language has been seized upon as evidence of a congressional intent
to withhold jurisdiction from the federal courts in particular types of cases.
"See Westor Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 757
(D.N.j. 1941):
The right which [the Sherman and Clayton Acts] give to a person to
recover threefold the damages he has sustained, is an unusual one, the
remedy drastic, and the Acts are to be strictly construed and not to be en-
larged by construction.
Id. at 762. Accord, Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587, 591 (7th Cir.
1957); Image & Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.
Mass, 1956).
42 See Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910); Ames v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F. 820, 823 (D. Mass. 1909).
43 As the Supreme Court has noted, "[The lower courts have been virtually
unanimous in concluding that Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a
remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust vio-
lation." Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-63 n.14 (1972) (dictum).
"See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
139 (1968); P.W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 191 F. Supp. 55, 60 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), re-rid on other grounds sub nom. House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co.,
298 F.2d 867, 870 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co.,
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conceived of by Congress as an essential component of the overall
legislative enforcement scheme. 45
Recognizing the importance of the private suit, the Supreme
Court has cautioned that the courts "should not add requirements to
burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically set forth by
Congress in [the antitrust laws]."" Therefore, any standing doctrine
applied in antitrust cases must be analyzed in terms of these two con-
flicting sets of interests: the judicially felt need for a limitation on the
number of private antitrust litigants, and the importance of the pri-
vate action as a mechanism for antitrust enforcement.
Against this backdrop of considerations relevant in antitrust, the
circuit courts have attempted to formulate a standing doctrine, relying
primarily on the "by reason of causation element of section 4. 47 Two
standards, the "direct-injury" test" and the "target-area" test,4" have
been developed to determine whether a plaintiff's injury was caused
"by reason or' anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.
The direct-injury test, which was first expressed by the Third
Circuit in Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.," focuses on the relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and the alleged antitrust violator. In Loeb, a
shareholder brought a treble damage action against Kodak alleging
that Kodak's antitrust violations had forced the corporation in which
the plaintiff-shareholder owned shares out of business." The court
held that the shareholder did not have standing because his injury
was "indirect, remote, and consequential," reasoning that the injury
caused by defendant's illegal conduct was to the corporation rather
than to the individual.52 Therefore, any loss suffered by the share-
137 F. Supp. 167, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Wham, Antitrust Treble-Damage Suits: The
Government's Chief Aid in Enforcement, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1954).
45 Lawlor v. National Screen Serv., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955); Kinnear-Weed
Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 214 F.2d 891, 893 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 912 (1955).
16 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957).
" See Mak mud, 521 F.2d at 1148.
"See, e.g., Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 729, 731 (10th Cir.),
cert, denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973); Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 732
(3d Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.
704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910); Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299,
302 (D. Mass.), affd per curiara, 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir,), cent, denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957).
"See, e.g., In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122,
129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United
Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
930 (1972); South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414,
418 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans
Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679, 689 (8th Cir. 1966); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil
Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 363 (9th Cir. 1955); Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc.,
193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
55
 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910). The action in Loeb was brought under 7 of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 705. Section 7 was superseded in 1914 by § 4 of the Clayton Act
which contains substantially the same language as § 7. Compare Clayton Act § 4, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1970) with Sherman Act, ch. 647, 7, 26 Stat. 210 (1890).
51 183 F. at 707.
52 Id. at 709.
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holder was derivative and, as such, too indirect to serve as the basis
for an antitrust action. 53
The doctrine enunciated in Loeb has been construed to mean
that,a plaintiff separated from the alleged violator by an intermediate
party lacks the directness of injury necessary to establish an injury by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." Thus, the test
limits standing to those in privity with the violator. 55 The application
of the direct-injury test has resulted in the delineation of classes, such
as "shareholders," 56
 "creditors,"51 and "lessors," 58 who are unable to
sue under section 4 because of the lack of a direct relationship with
the wrongdoer. Although resolving a difficult issue with some simplic-
ity and efficiency, the direct-injury test has been criticized as a "mere
search for labels" 59 rather than a bona fide "judicial inquiry." 6° Criti-
cism leveled against the test focuses on its obfuscation of the basic
53 Id. The court also emphasized that the plaintiff could have found a remedy in
the traditional shareholder's derivative suit. Id.
54 See, e.g., In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No, 31, 481 F.2d 122,
127 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United
Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1302 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
930 (1972); Beane, Antitrust: Standing and Passing On, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 331, 335
(1974); Comment, 64 Cottim. L. REV. 570, 582 (1964).
" See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 127
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973) and cases cited at notes 56-58 infra.
56 See, e.g., Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 732 (3d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); Bookout v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292,
294 (2d Cir. 1958); Peter v. Western Newspaper Union, 200 F.2d 867, 872 (5th Cir.
1953).
" See, e.g., Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299, 302-03,
affd per curiam, 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957); Cerli v. Silk
Ass'n of America, Inc., 36 F.2d 959, 960-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
55 See, e.g., Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518, 519 (3d Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 890 (1956).
69 1n re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 127 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 914 U.S. 1045 (1973).
"Id. In Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969), the Supreme Court
considered whether sales of gasoline at fixed lower prices, through a distributive chain
which began with sales to a wholesaler and ended with sales to a retail competitor of the
plaintiff and with the lower prices allegedly passed on at each step in the chain, was vio-
lative of § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a) (1970). 395 U.S. at 644. The Court, in reversing the court of appeals' holding
that such "fourth level" injuries were not protected by the Robinson-Patman Act, con-
cluded that "the competitive harm done ... is certainly no less because of the presence
of an additional link in this particular distribution chain ...." Id. at 648. Rejecting the
Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the presence of intermediate parties precluded recov-
ery, the Court stated that such a "limitation is wholly an artificial one and is completely
unwarranted by the language or purpose of the Act." Id. at 647. Although the Court
was applying a different section of the Clayton Act, its reasoning is equally persuasive
when applying § 4. By analogy, the harm to a § 4 plaintiff is no less damaging to his
competitive position than the competitive harm done by "fourth level" price discrimina-
tion because of the presence of an intermediate party. Therefore, any test which bases
standing upon the absence of such a link, as does the direct-injury test, appears to im-
pose an artificial limitation of the type criticized by the Supreme Court in Perkins.
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issue—whether a plaintiff and his alleged injury are within the intended
protection of section 4. 6 '
Furthermore, the direct-injury 'test imposes substantial burdens
on a litigant attempting to pursue a section 4 recovery. For example,
under the direct-injury test, the plaintiffs in Malamud would not have
had standing since they were not in privity with Sinclair, either
through contract or property interests. The investment companies' re-
lationship with Sinclair resulted from the contractual privity between
Malco and Sinclair rather than from any direct contractual relation-
ship of their own. Therefore, any allegation by them of a diminution
or loss of profits attributable to antitrust violations against Malco
would not withstand a "direct-injury" standing challenge. 62 Further-
more, a contention that any violation against Malco was also a viola-
tion against the investment companies because they had identical
shareholders would also fail, since Malco and the investment com-
panies had chosen to operate through different legal entities and, as
the Sixth Circuit has previously stated, "they must now abide by the
consequences." 3 The identical injury suffered by the investment
companies would have attracted judicial attention had the Malamuds
had enough foresight to confine all their activities to a single legal en-
tity. However, requiring litigants to consider, when organizing their
businesses, the likelihood of injury due to antitrust violations not only
results in an unreasonable burden on them should such wrongs actu-
ally be suffered, but also acts to undercut die preventative thrust of
the antitrust laws."
The second antitrust standing standard, the target-area test, fo-
cuses on the plaintiffs relationship to the area of the economy af-
fected by the alleged antitrust violation. The test was initially ex-
pressed by the Ninth Circuit in Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's,
Inc." In Studio Unions, a labor union and its members brought an ac-
tion under section 4 alleging violations of the antitrust laws." They
sought to recover for injuries caused by an alleged conspiracy between
81 See Beane, Antitrust: Standing and Passing On, 26 BAYLOR L. Rev. 331, 335
(1974); Comment, 64 CoLum. L. Rev. 570, 587 (1964).
"See Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (13.
Mass. 1956): "It is well settled that despite its broad language § 4 of the Clayton Act
does not give a private cause of action to a person whose losses result only from an in•
terruption or diminution of profitable relationships with the party directly affected by
alleged violations of the antitrust laws." Id. at 909. But see Congress Bldg. Corp. v.
Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587, 590-91, 595 (7th Cir. 1957).
63
 Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 394 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); accord, Skouras Theatres Corp. v. Radio-
Keith-Crpheutn Corp., 193 F. Supp. 401, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
64 It is not the potential victim who should have possible future antitrust prob-
lems in mind when involved in corporate organization. Rather, it is the potential
wrongdoer who when organizing his business should consider whether a particular cor-
porate structure will subject him to antitrust liability. Cf. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951).
6 ' 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
66 1d. at 52.
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major motion picture studios and another union to drive independent
studios out of business." The plaintiffs' theory of causation was that
the major studios' acts of restraining the production of motion pic-
tures and driving the independent studios out of business would re-
sult in fewer employment opportunities for the members of plaintiff's
union. 68 The court, in holding that plaintiffs did not have standing,
reasoned that the conspiracy was directed at motion picture produc-
tion and not employment. Therefore, since the plaintiffs were not en-
gaged in such production their injuries were not direct enough to
support a treble damage suit." In closing, the court enunciated the
target-area test: to establish standing, a complainant
must show that he is within that area of the economy which
is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in
a particular industry. Otherwise he is not injured "by
reason" of anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws."
The Ninth Circuit refined this test in Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil
Corp.," where the court required not only that the plaintiff show that
he was "hit" by the antitrust violation but also that he was "aimed
at." 72 In Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn," the same court
construed the requirement added by Karseal to mean that it must have
been foreseeable that the defendant's conduct would have an adverse
effect on the market in which the plaintiff was operating." Both of
these decisions further emphasized that the critical - factor in drawing
the proper line is the economic area affected rather than the status of
the plaintiff vis-a-vis the wrongdoer.
It would appear that the plaintiffs in Malamud would not have
been barred under a target-area approach. The alleged illegal conduct
by Sinclair was aimed at limiting the number of new retail outlets for
petroleum products through a refusal to provide the financial assis-
" Id.
"Id. at 53.
° 9 1d. at 54.
'° Id. at 54-55.
" 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).
75 1d. at 362.
" 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964).
74 Id. at 220. The 20th Century court added the foreseeability requirement to
make it clear that the Karseal requirement that the defendant must have aimed at the
plaintiff did not mean that the defendant must have had an intent to injure the particu-
lar antitrust plaintiff, but rather that the "plaintiff must show that, whether or not then
known to the conspirators, plaintiffs affected operation was actually in the area which it
could reasonably be foreseen would be affected by the conspiracy." Id. However, not all
the circuits which adhere to the target-area doctrine focus on the foreseeability of the
injury. See, e.g., Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971). Compare Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions, 433
F.2d 1073, 1076 n.4 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971) with Fields Pro-
ductions, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd per
curiam, 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 19701.
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Lance required for service station construction. 75 Limiting the number
of service stations would affect the entire chain of commerce involved
in supplying petroleum products for eventual sale to the consumer.
Thus, the entire economic community engaged in supplying pe-
troleum products would be endangered by a breakdown of competi-
tive conditions in the station financing market. The plaintiffs were in
that area of the economy. The growth of their business—developing
and operating new service stations—was directly related to the exist-
ence of an economic climate in which the number of new stations was
not artifically controlled. Similarly, Sinclair could have foreseen the
adverse effects of anti-competitive conditions on the area of the econ-
omy in which plaintiffs operated. Thus, it appears that the plaintiffs
in Malamud would have had standing under the target-area test.
The target-area test is presently applied in a majority of the
circuits." Although the test does attempt to respond to the inade-
quacies of the direct-injury test by focusing on the economic area af-
fected rather than the status of the victim, its application has been
criticized nonetheless as "operatting) to prohibit plaintiffs from suing
by applying labels, rather than trying to examine the economic rela-
tionships of prospective plaintiffs to the antitrust violations"" and as
"no more capable than the directness doctrine of vindicating public
policy."" The target-area test has also been viewed as "a conceptual
limitation, and at times vague, confusing and inconsistently applied."'"
Notwithstanding the outcome with respect to the Malamud plaintiffs,
the target-area test, even though more liberal than the direct-injury
test, also demands a great deal of a plaintiff. He must allege facts to
show an area of the economy was affected," that he carried on busi-
ness in that area,H' that the area was aimed at," and that his injury
was a foreseeable result of defendant's conduct." In sum, he must
show that a violation of the antitrust laws has occurred, in the plead-
ing stage of the litigation prior to an opportunity to enage in
discovery." Certainly, these are not the "general allegations' envis-
72 521 F.2d at 1151-52.
" See cases cited at notes 48 & 49 supra.
77 Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d
1292, 1303 (2d Cir. 1971) (Levet, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
78 Id, See also Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv., Inc. v. Association of Cas. & Sur.
Cos., 382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967) where the Tenth Circuit, in refusing to abandon its
adherence to the direct-injury test and adopt the target-area test, stated: "(Wie need not
seek new language to express the same doctrine." Id. at 928.
72 Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d
1292, 1303-04 (2d Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 40(5 U.S. 930 (1972).
"" See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 129
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
a' Id.
82 Karseal Corp. v, Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 1955).
83 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 220 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964). See note 74 supra.
" The problem with the showing required of a plaintiff in a target-area jurisdic-
tion is primarily that of having to make the showing prior to discovery. Particularly in
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aged by the Supreme Court" nor the general notice type pleading
expressed in the federal requirement of a "short and plain statement
of the claim." 80
 Many of the allegations in such a complaint go to the
merits, so that the target-area test requires the court to make an ad-
judication on the merits in the pleading stages of litigation uniformly
containing complex factual issues, 87
 a practice criticized by the Su-
preme Court. 88
11. THE DATA PROCESSING STANDARD: PROBLEMS 1N APPLICATION
AND VIABILITY AS A REPLACEMENT
In Malamud, the Sixth Circuit rejected both the direct-injury test
and the target-area test, and chose instead to apply the two-part test
developed by the Supreme Court in Data Processing. 89
 The issue in
Data Processing was whether the plaintiffs, an association of data pro-
cessors and a corporation engaged in data processing, had standing,
as "aggrieved" persons under section 702 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act," to challenge a Comptroller of Currency's ruling which
allowed national banks to provide data processing services to other
banks and bank customers." The Court, in an opinion written by Jus-
tice Douglas, defined the requisites of standing as (1) whether there is
an injury in fact as required by the "case or controversy" mandate of
Article III, and (2) "whether the interest sought to be protected by
the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be pro-
circuits where the 20th Century foreseeability element is not the focus of the test, a plain-
tiff may be required to show that the defendant possessed an actual purpose or intent
to injure him, without the benefit of investigation into information in the hands of the
defendant. Cf. Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, inc., 454
F.2d 1292, 1296 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972), The plaintiff may
therelbre he required to delve into facts constituting the merits of the case at a time
when he may be ill-equipped to do so. Although the focus in the Ninth Circuit on the
foreseeability of the injury alleviates this problem in part, a plaintiff is still required to
plead that the injury was reasonably foreseeable from the defendant's vantage point. Cf.
In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 199 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 919 (1974). The plaintiff must, therefore, be privy to information evidencing the
defendant's ,vantage point as well as the information which the defendant possessed
when he entered upon the allegedly illegal course of conduct.
"I Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957).
" a FED. R. Civ, P. 8(a).
" Malamud, 52l F.2d at 1199-50.
"" In Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962), the Court
cautioned that summary judgment "should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litiga-
tion where ... the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile
witnesses thicken the plot." Id. at 473.
H 9 521 F.2d at 1151.
5 U.S,C, § 702 (1970):
Right of Review.
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a rel-
evant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.




 or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question.""2
 In holding that the plaintiffs did have standing, the Court
concluded that they had suffered injury in fact due to a loss of profits
occasioned by the competition of national banks in the business of
data processing." Also, section 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act
of l962"4
 was held to be a relevant statute, arguably designed to pro-
tect competitors, such as the plaintiffs, of national banks engaged in
non-banking activities."
The applicability of the Data Processing test in cases not involving
challenges to administrative action has been questioned by both the
courts" and commentators." Questioning of the test's applicability
outside of the administrative law field has been concerned primarily
with whether a rest designed to determine standing in challenges to
administrative orders is controlling in cases not involving the right of
" Id. at 153.
" 1d. at 152.
" 4 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1970). Section 4 provides: "No bank service corporation may
engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for banks."
" 397 U.S. at 156, 157.
"See Postal Workers Detroit Local v. Independent Postal Sys. of America, Inc.,
481 F.2c1 90, 92-93. (6th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 1110, cert. dismissed, 415 U.S.
901 (1974); Solien v, Teamsters Local 610, 440 F.2d 124, 132 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 905 (1971). There is, however, some precedent for the application of Data Proces-
sing in non-administrative actions. See, e.g., Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833, 839
(6th Cir. 1971), vacated on other grounds, 410 U.S. 950 (1973); Culligan v. Activities Club,
Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 691 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). The Third Circuit
applied the Data Processing test in a case involving non-administrative governmental ac-
tion, reasoning that even though Data Processing had involved standing to secure judicial
review of an agency action, "nonetheless the opinion enunciates a concept which is at
least helpful in deciding the present question." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 450 F.2d
199, 210 n.16 (3d Cir.), affd sub nom. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1971).
There have also been instances of' the test's application in non-governmental,
non-administrative actions. in Letter Carriers v. Independent Postal Sys. of America,
470 17 .2(1 265 (10th Cir. 1972), the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's determina-
tion that plaintiff letter carriers association had standing to enjoin defendant corpora-
tion from delivering Christmas cards bearing privately issued postage. Id. at 269-71.
The district court had concluded that the zone of interest test was applicable since "the
Postal Laws regulate the employment opportunities and practices of the members of
Plaintiff's organization.... But, if' not, the POstal Reorganization Act of 1970 ... has
recognized and seekS to protect (as well as regulate) the interests and employment op-
portunities of the Postal employees ...." Letter Carriers v. Independent Postal Sys. of
America, 336 F. Supp. 804, 807 (W.D. Okla. 1971). Similarly, the court of appeals re-
lied on the Data Processing test in finding that plaintiff had standing as a "would-he"
competitor of the defendant and since the statute in question arguably brought com-
petitors within the zone of interests protected. 407 F.2d at 270. Thus, the court implied
that clue to the regulatory aspects of both agency actions and postal laws the use of a
test developed for the former could be justifiably and logically applied to the latter,
An analogy can he drawn between the postal case and the treble damage suit. Al-
though not an explicit purpose of the antitrust laws, they do operate to regulate busi-
ness and industry by forbidding and punishing certain practices. See, e.g., Breit & El-
zinga, Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes Toward RUA: An Economic Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV.
693, 706.08 (1973),
"7 See, e.g., Hasl, Standing Revisited—The Aftermath of Data Processing, 18 ST. L.U.L.J.
12 (1973).
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judicial review of agency actions, and whether "the attitude of the Su-
preme Court in the agency cases reflects a broadening tendency and
presages the extension of the 'zone of interests' test ... to private
party litigation." 98 The Malamud court responded to the first of these
two issues and held that the test was the proper standard for deter-
mining treble damage standing. 99
The test's application in such cases was justified by the Sixth Cir-
cuit on two grounds. First, the court discerned a similarity between
section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act and section 4 of the
Clayton Act, in that both employ broad language to define the class of
persons authorized to sue under each statute and both make refer-
ence to other statutes to supply the substantive law.'" Section 4 de-
fines the class as "any person injured" and makes reference to the an-
titrust laws"' while section 702 refers to "a person ... adversely af-
fected or aggrieved within the meaning of a relevant statute."'" This
analysis by the court, while focusing on the consistency of legislative
format, fails to reach the basic issue of whether there is enough simi-
-Iarity between the two sections to conclude that the legislative purpose
behind section 4 will be served by application of the Data Processing
test.
The second ground proposed in Malamud does address itself to
this basic issue. Based on an understanding of the nature of antitrust
litigation and the policy underlying private antitrust suits, the court
concluded that the Data Processing test should be utilized because
a private antitrust action is not the typically private suit
which raises no standing issues because the real party in in-
terest is obvious. Because a private action under Section 4
has some considerable enforcement value, it is in the nature
of a public suit. As with a suit in the administrative law
field, a private antitrust claim seeks both to remedy the al-
leged injury to the private plaintiff and to "vindicate the
important public interest in free competition." 103
In light of the nature and goals of both treble damage actions and
agency cases, this second justification for the application of the Data
Processing test is somewhat persuasive. By providing for both public'"
and private' 05
 enforcement of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, Con-
gress evidenced a belief that the interests protected by those Acts are
98 Postal Workers Detroit Local v. Independent Postal Sys. of America, Inc., 349
F. Supp. 1297, 1298 (F.D. Mich. 1972), alp,  481 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. granted,
419 U.S. 1110, cert. dismissed, 415 U.S. 901 (1974).
99 521 F.2d at 1151.
'°° Id.
101 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). See text at note 31 supra,
1 ° 2 5 U.S.C. 702 (1970). See note 90 supra.
ns 521 F.2d at 1151 (citations omitted).
19' 15 U.S.C. 4 (1970).
1 °3 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
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both public and private in nature.'°° It is clear that those laws were
designed to "protect the victims of the forbidden practice," 1 ° 7 but it is
also apparent that, in providing a ,private remedy for the victim, a
basic public interest in free enterprise in the interstate market is being
served.'" Thus, the treble damage provision was also intended to
punish"° and deter certain practices which have "come to be re-
garded as a special form of public injury,""° with the private litigants
acting as "an ancillary force of private investigators to supplement the
Department of Justice."'"
Recent decisions similarly indicate the two-fold nature of private
challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act to federal agency
actions.'" By legislative mandate most agencies are instructed to ad-
minister their programs in the public interest. 113 Therefore, claimants
in an administrative action serve not only to vindicate their own in-
terests but those of the public as well"" and such claimants have re-
peatedly been afforded the right to sue to enforce the public
interest."s Thus, the Sixth Circuit's analysis of the similarity between
the general goals of the Administrative Procedure Act and the anti-
"" See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219, 236 (1948); United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp, 167,
171 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
107 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957).
"" See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
As the special provision awarding treble damages to successful plaintiffs illustrates,
Congress has encouraged private antitrust litigation not merely to compensate those
who have been directly injured but also to vindicate the important public interest in
free competition. Id. at 502; accord, Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445,
453-54 (1957). See generally MacIntyre, 'lite Role of the Private Litigant in Antitrust En-
forcement, 7 ANTimusT BULL. 113 (1962).
1 " The punitive aspect of the treble damage action was evident in Commissioner
v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), where the Supreme Court, in holding
against the taxpayer in a deficiency suit for his failure to include two-thirds of a treble
damage recovery in gross income, stated that "Mt would be an anomaly that could not
be justified ... to say that recovery for actual damages is taxable but not the additional
amount extracted as punishment for the same conduct which caused the injury." Id. at
431 (emphasis added).
"O Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
Quernos Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949, 950
(D.N.J. 1940); see Comment, 4.9 YALE L.J. 284, 296 (1939),
1 " In Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kuitzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970), petition for
cert. dismissed, 40l U.S. 950 (1971), the court stated that the "interest being protected is
basically the public interest." Id. at 1208.
13 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 79g(a)(2) (1970) (the Commissioner of the Securities and
Exchange Commission under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 may
prescribe such rules and regulations as are "necessary or appropriate in the public in-
terest"); 16 U.S.C. § 824c(a) (1970) (the Commissioner of the Federal Power Commis-
sion may make orders under the section only if he finds that they are "compatible with
the public interest").
114 See Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV, L. REV. 633, 635 (1971).
"5 See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686-88 (1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428
F.2d 1093, 1096-97 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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trust statutes is defensible."° Notwithstanding such an analysis, how-
ever, the existence of a similarity of goals is not sufficient, in itself, to
insure that the purposes of section 4 will be furthered by the applica-
tion of the Data Processing test.
The critical question in formulating a standing doctrine is
whether, within the confines of Article III,"' it succeeds in carrying
congressional intent into effect. This inquiry necessarily raises ques-
tions of whether the purpose of the legislation is promoted by allow-
ing certain parties access to the courts and whether the standing test
so formulated efficiently and precisely furthers the legislative intent. The
fundamental question for antitrust purposes is thus whether the zone
of interests test, as applied for the first time in an antitrust case in
Malamud, responds adequately to the conflict between the need for a
line of demarcation and the policy of private enforcement in a man-
ner certain enough to provide a workable, objective standing test.
Taken literally, the injury in fact element of the Data Processing
test could be construed to require only that the complainant show
some pecuniary harm.'" However, any interpretation of the test for
use in antitrust litigation must be made with reference to the wording
of section 4. Thus, to establish an injury in fact under section 4 a
claimant must allege an injury to his "business or property."" 9
 Since
the "business or property" phrase has consistently been construed to
mean "commercial ventures or enterprises,"' 20 it appears that a mere
allegation of injury to a plaintiff's non-commercial financial status or
to the economy in general would be insufficient. However, any injury
to a plaintiff's business regardless of how attenuated the causal chain
might be would satisfy the requirement of an injury in fact under
Data Processing, since the injury in fact element requires nothing more
of a plaintiff than that which would be required by a literal reading of
section 4. 12 ' Such a result would run counter to the great weight of
case authority, however, which requires a more restrictive reading of
section 4 in order to limit the number of antitrust plaintiffs.' 22 There-
fore, the injury in fact element of the Data Processing test standing
alone would not limit the availability of section 4, and would conse-
"6 See text at note 103 supra.
'" The strictures of Article III raise the constitutional question of whether there
is a "case" or "controversy," providing a safeguard against use of the federal courts as
"a forum [for the airing of] generalized grievances." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106
(1968).
1 " Some commentators have suggested that injury in fact should be the only re-
quirement for standing. See Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV.
450, 457, 472 (1970); Sedler, Standing, Justiciability, and All That A Behavioral Analysis, 25
VAND. L. REV. 479, 511-12 (1972). For a discussion of the problems raised by such a
suggestion in the antitrust field see text at notes 194-146 infra.
"g 15 U.S.C. 4 15 (1970).
"° See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972); Roseland v.
Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1992).
' 1 See text at note 32 supra.
1 " See cases cited at note 37 supra.
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quently fail to respond to the need for a line of demarcation.
The second part of the Data Processing test, however, has the po-
tential for both limiting and expanding the availability of section re-
covery. The second prong of the test is the non-constitutional re-
quirement that a claimant show that the interest invaded by the al-
leged illegal conduct is "arguably within the zone of the interests to be
protected." 123 The key to the success of this element as a restrictive
factor is the careful delineation of the boundaries of the "zone of in-
terests." The same element of the test also has the potential to
liberalize the demands placed upon the plaintiff by requiring only
that he allege invasion of interests which are "arguably" within the
protected zone. Under the Data Processing test as applied in Malamud,
for example, a litigant must exhibit that he is an intended beneficiary
of the statutory protection provided by the antitrust laws, thereby dis-
playing interests protected by those laws. 12 ' However, a plaintiff
need only allege the existence of such interests, and then only in the
most general way; he need not convince the court on a standing chal-
lenge that his interests are indeed within the protected zone, but only
that they are "arguably" so.' 25 That the Data Processing test has the po-
tential to be less burdensome while, at the same time, not completely
limitless argues favorably for its use. Whether the test will have such
an effect in practice, however, depends on how the courts solve the
various problems concerning the application of the test.
In application, the Data Processing test may not result in decisions
reflecting any greater ability to achieve the balance between the two
conflicting sets of antitrust principles than the other two tests. A
number of commentators have pointed to questions raised by the Data
Processing doctrine; specifically, which statute a court should look to in
determining the zone of interests, how a court should determine the
zone of interests once having decided which statute to apply, and how
it should interpret the term "arguably." 126 These questions have par-
ticular relevance in antitrust litigation.
In the antitrust context, the problem of which statute should be
applied is simply whether the "statute in question" is section 4 of the
Clayton Act or the other substantive provisions of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts describing the forbidden conduct. Resolution of this
issue is fundamental to an actual application of the test, since the zone
of interests may differ depending on the statute selected. The
Malamud court stated that plaintiffs' interests were arguably within the
"zone of interests protected by the Sherman and Clayton Acts," imply-
ing that the "statute in question" is actually the entire body of substan-
in 397 U.S. at 153.
131 See 521 F.2d at 1151-52. See text at notes 126-139 infra.
146 See 521 F.2d at 1151-52. See text at notes 140.147 infra.
"'I See Davis, supra note 118, at 458-68; HasI, supra note 97, at 31-38; Jaffee,
supra note 114, at 634; •Sedler, supra note 118, at 484-88; Comment, 69 Mica. L. Rev.
540, 551-60 (1971).
505
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
tive antitrust law.'" It is possible that other courts, however, when
applying the Data Processing test, may consider that the zone involved
encompasses the interest of the private party in being able to recover
for losses sustained due to antitrust violations. It might therefore be
argued that section 4 alone should be selected as the statute in ques-
tion, since it provides the private right of recovery.'" Nevertheless,
the history of standing litigation in the antitrust area bears out the
proposition that part of the search for an adequate standing doctrine
has been based on the need for objective criteria to define the scope
of the protection of section 4. 129
 To attempt to satisfy that need by ap-
plying a test which focuses once again on the definition of the zone of
interests protected by section 4 would be circular and unproductive.
Therefore, the relevant statute is not section 4 alone but rather the
entire body of substantive antitrust law.
Once a statute has been selected by the court under Data Proces-
sing, additional and more difficult problems arise. One such problem
1 " 521 F.2d at 1152. The court initially stated that the plaintiffs' interest had to
fall within the protection of § 1 of the Sherman Act or § 3 of the Clayton Act since
those were the relevant substantive statutes under which plaintiffs alleged a violation.
Id. at 1151. However, the court went on to analyze the scope of the protected zone by
reference to concepts which apply generally to the antitrust provisions and concluded
by stating:
The antitrust laws were enacted to preserve competition and thereby to
protect the individual plaintiff and the consuming public from the effects
of any combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade. Under the cir-
cumstances alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint, this denial of financing ar-
guably comes within the zone of interests protected by the Sherman and
Clayton Acts.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, the court apparently based its analysis
and, therefore, its conclusion on the interests protected by the entire body of antitrust
law.
The court's reference to specific sections does, however, raise the possibility of a
different approach to the "statute in question." Perhaps courts will find it necessary to
analyze the substantive sections of the Sherman and Clayton Acts separately and deter-
mine the protected zone for each section. For example, the interest protected by § 1 of
the Sherman Act might be described as the interest in being free from restraints of
trade brought about by agreement or combination of competitors. The prohibition
against interlocking directorates in § 8 of the Clayton Act might be viewed as protecting
the interest in an absence of restrictions on competition arising from a situation where
supposedly competing companies are controlled by the same persons. And the interest
which § 3 of the Clayton Act might be deemed to protect could be analyzed as the in-
terest in not having trade restrained by the use of exclusive dealing contracts going
beyond actual business needs.
125
 Such a choice would be unlikely if the Malamud court's justification for apply-
ing the Data Processing test were followed since the court, in discussing the similarity be-
tween § 702 of the APA and § 4, stated: "Both sections accord standing in light of
other statutory .provisions." 521 F.2d at 1151. The implication is that since those other
statutory provisions must be considered, standing should not be granted or denied on
the basis of § 4 alone. For an example of where the review provisions themselves have
been deemed the statute in question, see Upper Pews Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233,
1235 (10th Cir. 1971) where the court found that the interests asserted were within the
zone protected by the Administrative Procedure Act.
 -
1 " See text at notes 33.43 supra. See also Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Ele-
ments of a Treble-Damage Antitrust Action, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 691, 707 (1963).
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is determining what interests fall within the "zone of interests to be
protected or regulated" by the chosen statute.' 3 ° It is difficult to find
a concrete definition of the interests protected by the antitrust laws."'
The case law abounds with statements that the purpose of the anti-
trust laws is to foster free competition and to protect an atmosphere
conducive to economic growth.'" One text writer has stated gener-
ally: "[Tihroughout the history of these statutes it has constantly been
assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetrate and perserve,
for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of indus-
try in small units which can effectively compete with each other.' 33
The legislative history does not provide any more definitive
guidelines.'" Senator Sherman described the purpose of the Sherman
Act as the prevention and control of combinations created "to prevent
competition, or for the restraint of trade, or to increase the profits of
the producer at the cost of the consumer."'" Senator George en-
visioned the bill as a protector of "all small men, all small capitalists,
all small enterprises" from being crushed by "the present system of
production and exchange."'" While such generalities may have been
helpful for the purposes of enacting the legislation they are not very
useful in answering the specific question of whether a particular in-
terest asserted in a case is protected by the antitrust statutes.
For example, one possible solution to the scope of the zone of
interests might be to require a plaintiff to assert that he suffered an
injury to his opportunity to operate his business in an atmosphere
' 3" The administrative cases applying Data Processing are of little help in deciding
how the problem generally is to be approached. Some courts have failed to state exactly
from which statute the zone of interests applied in the case came, or if a statute was
identified, the court failed to analyze the statute or its legislative history. See, e.g., Virgin
Islands Hotel Ass'n, Inc. v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Auth„ 465 F.2d 1272 (3d
Cir, 1972); Tucker v, Hardin, 430 F.2t1 737 (lst Cir. 1970). On the other hand, there
are decisions in the administrative law field which are based on detailed analysis of the
statute in question. See e.g., Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204, 1209-15 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), petition for cert. dismissed, 401 U.S. 950 (1971) ("EWle need merely note that
all of the legislative history is relevant to a reviewing court's determination of the scope
and purpose of legislation under consideration ... ." Id. at 1213.); Allen M. Campbell
Co. Gen. Contractors v. Lloyd Wood Const. Co., 446 F.2d 261, 269 (5th Cir. 1971);
M.M. Crockin Co. v. Portsmouth Redev. & Housing Auth., 437 F.2d 784, 787-88 (4th
Cir. 1971). Nonetheless, there is ample support for the criticism that "Wile test is cum-
bersome, inconvenient, and artificial." Davis, supra note 118, at 462 (1970), especially in
the antitrust field.
' 3 ' The question is posed in terms of the entire body of antitrust law. For a dis-
cussion of alternative formulations see note 127 and text at notes 125-129 supra.
'" See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); Fortner En-
terprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969); Northern Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
I" L.B. SCHWARTZ, FREE; ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (CONCEN-
TRA•ION AND RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES) 8 (3d ed. 1966).
1 " See generally 21 Cong. Rec. 2456.60 (1890); H.R. Rm.. No. 1707, 51st Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1890).
' 33 21 Cong. Rec. at 2457.
'" Id. at 2598.
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conducive to economic growth. If such were the case, any conduct
which injured a plaintiff's business or property could arguably be
viewed as also injuring the conduciveness of the business atmosphere
to economic growth. Therefore, any allegation of an injury in fact to
the plaintiff's business or property would be at the same time an alle-
gation of an invasion of an interest arguably within the zone of inter-
ests protected. However, such a result, which would make the injury
in fact in a particular case equivalent to the interest protected, would
render the second prong of the Data Processing test superfluous and
of minimal assistance in restricting the scope of section 4. 137 If, in the
alternative, the test were narrowed so that a plaintiff would be re-
quired to assert an injured interest in that particular section of the
economy in which he actually competes, the resulting class of plain-
tiffs would include the same persons authorized under the target-area
approach. There is little, if any, difference between a requirement
that the plaintiff operate in the "affected area of the economy" 138 and
a requirement that the plaintiff assert an interest in functioning freely
in that section of the economy in which he transacts his business.'" If
such a result would flow from the use of the Data Processing test, it
would be difficult to enunciate any valid reason for its application. An
existing test would be abandoned for a new one only to reach the
same conclusions.
Although it may be possible to define the zone of interests pro-
tected by the antitrust laws, it must be done with care. When deter-
mining the boundaries of the zone of interests, consideration should
be given to the possibility that if the zone is defined by reference to
extremely general concepts the test may become one-pronged rather
than two. Care should also be taken to avoid establishing a zone which
would describe a class of plaintiffs identical to the class described
under the target-area test.
The Supreme Court's use in Data Processing of the elastic term,
"arguably," raises further, equally difficult definitional problems. It is
unclear precisely how much a plaintiff will be required to show in
order to convince a court that his interest is "arguably" within the
zone of interests protected. It has been suggested that this qualifica-
tion was intended to give the lower federal courts broad discretion in
applying the Data Processing test.' 4° Therefore, the courts can, within
137 See note 118 and text at notes 118-122 supra.
' 3" In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 129 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
' 31' Under such an approach to the zone of interests test, for example, the in-
vestment companies would have to allege that because of Sinclair's activities their busi-
ness could not grow and prosper in that certain area of the economy in which they
conducted business. Outside that area they would have no business interests which
could suffer. Such an area would also be the same and only area of the economy in
which the investment companies would suffer an injury due to a "breakdown of com-
petitive conditions." Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
See Comment, 69 Mtcti. L. REV. 540, 551 (1971).
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the scope of this discretion, construe the test quite liberally. In fact,
many courts have done so"' with the result that standing has been
granted under the test more often than it has been denied.' 42 Fre-
quently, judicial reliance on the term "arguably" has eliminated care-
ful analysis of the "zone of interests."'" In the field of antitrust law,
such a reliance would result in a loss of the restrictive effect which a
careful analysis of the zone could have.'"
Furthermore, if the application of the test becomes too casual, it
is possible that the test will become one-pronged rather than two be-
cause "a plaintiff who establishes injury in fact, also will satisfy the
zone of interests test in either the private or public action." 14" In an-
titrust law, dependence on the injury in fact element alone is not
readily justifiable since this would render the "by reason of phrase of
section 4 mere surplusage. The language of section 4 requires that a
plaintiff be able to allege a nexus between the injury to his business or
property and the conduct allegedly in violation of the antitrust laws. A
standing test which required only a showing of an injury in fact would
not strike a balance between the two conflicting sets of antitrust stand-
ing principles; it would merely eliminate consideration of one. Some-
thing more than an allegation of injury to the plaintiff's business or
property is necessary if the availability of section 4 protection is to be
appropriately limited.'"
In light of the manner in which courts in other areas of law have
applied the Data Processing test, it is likely that courts hearing section 4
cases will rely heavily on the term "arguably," to determine whether
the interests alleged are within the zone of interests protected by the
antitrust laws. While emphasis on the term may result in a liberal ap-
plication of the test, 147 thereby easing the burden on the private liti-
gant, attention must be directed to the possibility that if the test
thereby becomes too liberal, the restrictive effect of the "zone of in-
terests" requirement on the number of plaintiffs will be nullified.
CONCLUSION
The history of litigation over standing in antitrust, unlike that in
other areas of law, has been a series of limitations on the availability
of the antitrust laws to only those plaintiffs Congress clearly intended
to protect. However, any limitation must be imposed with regard for
"I See, e.g., Hodgson v. Carpenters Resilient Flooring Local 2212, 457 F.2d 1364,
1369 (3d Cir. 1972); Iacopi v. FCC, 451 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 1971); Shannon v.
HUD, 436 F.2(1, 809, 818 (3d Cir. 1970).
148 See Has], supra note 97, at 35.
"° See Constructors Civiles de Centroainerica, S.A. v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183,
1189 (D C. Cir. 1972); Harry H. Price & Sons, Inc. v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1137, 1140-41
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971).
144 See text at notes 129.139 ,supra.
143 Sedler, supra note 118, at 511,
1 " See text at notes 118-122 supra.
147 See text at notes 123-125 supra.
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the Supreme Court's affirmative position that the private litigant is an
essential ingredient in the effective enforcement of the antitrust laws
and, therefore, should not be overly burdened in the early stages of
litigation. Thus, for an antitrust standing test to be viable, it must be
capable of limiting the number of antitrust litigants without limiting
them to such an extent that they are no longer of any assistance in
enforcement.
The Data Processing test has the potential of limiting the number
of private antitrust litigants by requiring that they show an injury to
interests which were intended to be protected by the antitrust laws. By
requiring that the interests allegedly injured need be only "arguably"
within the scope of the intended protection, the restriction on the
number of litigants will not be so extensive as to minimize their use-
fulness as part of the antitrust enforcement machinery. The issue thus
becomes whether such potential can be realized effectively.
To insure that the Data Processing qualifier, "arguably," will not
take a meaning so flexible that no limitations are imposed at all, the
term cannot take the place of bona fide analysis of the zone of in-
terests protected by the antitrust laws. While expansive application of
the term "arguably" eases the pleading burden on the litigant, thereby
satisfying one antitrust principle, it is careful analysis of the zone of
interests protected that satisfies the corresponding principle of limit-
ing the size of the class of antitrust plaintiffs. If these issues are care-
fully resolved in a manner responsive to the Supreme Court's admoni-
tion that the courts should ask no more of a plaintiff than that which
is required by the antitrust statutes themselves,"" and in a manner
which makes the application of the test definite and consistent enough
to give business and industry a framework within which to gauge
whether their activities are potentially subject to treble damage liabil-
ity, then the replacement of the old direct-injury and target-area
standing tests with the Data Processing standard may be justified.
If, on the other hand, these issues are not acknowledged and
carefully resolved, and the class of plaintiffs remains the same or be-
comes more restricted, further application of the Data Processing test
in section 4 cases may only "compound present confusion and breed
even more litigation over standing""" without enhancing the courts'
ability "to confine the availability of section 4 relief ... to those indi-
viduals whose protection is the fundamental purpose of the antitrust
laws."'"
LYNNE E. LARKIN
' See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957).
"9
 Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 176 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting). This
opinion also applies to Data Processing. 397 U.S. at 167.
"Din re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 125 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
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